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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE CRISIS OF INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY: THE
WANING OPTIONS
Frank P. Grad*
Professor Grad argues that the current "medical malpractice crisis," mirroring
the crisis of 1975, is in reality a crisis of insurance availability. The crisis has its roots
in the very foundation of the entrenched American medical malpractice system. He
discusses in detail the social and economic costs of the established American method
of dealing with medical injury, including the inability of the system to encourage
increased physician competence, the costly practice of defensive medicine, the inherent
waste involved in litigating or settling claims, and the inequitable distribution of com-
pensation to victims of medical negligence. He examines the palliative, legislative
measures enacted in response to the crisis, such as shortening statutes of limitations,
providing caps on recovery, and establishing alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms In view of the ineffectiveness of this symptomatic approach, Professor Grad
advocates completely replacing the current American system with a no-fault, compen-
sation system in which all qualifying victims of untoward medical outcomes, whether
or not due to negligence, would be compensated.
INTRODUCTION
THE SO-CALLED medical malpractice crisis, in reality a crisis of
insurance availability, had its origins in the late 1960's, when the
number of negligence actions arising out of automobile accidents
was considerably reduced in many states by the advent of no-fault
automobile compensation.'
The medical malpractice crisis received major attention in the
early 1970's, and in 1973 was the subject of a major report by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (now Health
* J.P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, and Director of the Legislative Drafting
Research Fund, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., Brooklyn College (1947); LL.B.,
Columbia University School of Law (1949). The author was Counsel to the Special Advisory
Panel on Medical Malpractice, State of New York, 1975-76, whose report is referred to in this
work.
1. It is interesting to speculate whether the decrease in the number of negligence ac-
tions for automobile accidents had any impact on the increase of medical malpractice liability
actions. It has been observed that the number of elective surgeries increases with the number
of surgeons practicing in the area. While no cause and effect relationship can be shown in
either instance, both of them provide food for thought.
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and Human Services). At the time, attention was focused on the
increased number of medical malpractice actions. The problem of
insurance availability had not yet become a major concern and was
not even mentioned in the Secretary's report. But a mere two years
later, in 1974-75, America had its first full-fledged medical insur-
ance availability crisis.
The crisis of 1975 received a great deal of attention from profes-
sionals and authors in the field, as well as from federal and state
governmental agencies and legislatures. A great deal of legislation
has been enacted since 1975, intended to cure the medical malprac-
tice insurance problem and to avoid the recurrence of the crisis.
The developments of the past ten years have shown that these
purported solutions failed to address the root causes of the crisis
and did little more than paper over the problem. Predictably, the
legislation failed to stave off a further crisis in 1985. This second
crisis, a carbon copy of the crisis of 1975, was, in reality, a continua-
tion of the earlier one.
One option is to regard the problem as a chronic one, and to
provide a temporary "fix" every ten years or so, hoping that some-
how we will muddle through or that the problem will take care of
itself. It is possible that some other problem might become the fo-
cus of our and the trial bar's attention. For instance, as more and
more injuries resulting from exposure to hazardous waste are dis-
covered, hazardous waste personal injury litigation might take the
"heat" off medical malpractice. However, we cannot rely on this
displacement.
This Article will review medical malpractice in the context of
the tort law liability insurance configuration, and will analyze this
configuration with particular reference to its cost as part of the gen-
eral cost of the rendition of personal health services. It will also
review the measures taken to remedy the health care system follow-
ing the 1975 insurance availability crisis, and examine current legis-
lative efforts to salvage the system in the light of past failures.
Finally, since the 1975 to 1985 legislative efforts failed, as was inevi-
table in view of the nature of the problem, this Article proposes the
substitution of a no-fault compensation system. This system would
solve the problem of insurance availability, and provide the most
cost-effective, least expensive, means of protecting persons injured
by adverse medical outcomes.
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I. THE GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ON THE RENDITION OF HEALTH CARE
Under the common law, a physician can be held liable for dam-
age resulting from his failure to exercise the degree of reasonable
and ordinary care, diligence, and skill in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of his patient that physicians engaged in the same line of prac-
tice during the same period of time ordinarily possess and exercise.2
Thus, malpractice liability, a subset of the law of tort, is imposed on
the physician for failing to meet the usual, accepted standard of care
in treating a patient.' Strictly speaking, it defines the duties arising
out of a One-to-one, physician to patient, relationship. But this pri-
vate relationship gives rise to issues of health care of national scope
with attendant public cost.
Medical malpractice, while initially a failure of a private rela-
tionship, is indeed a major public problem. Although most physi-
cians are competent and careful practitioners, there are a significant
number of instances of medical malpractice and even more medical
malpractice claims. Even assuming that the majority of medical
malpractice claims are unfounded, the number of claims raises is-
sues of physician competence, which is a substantial public issue.'
To protect themselves against medical malpractice claims, some
physicians resort to the practice of "defensive medicine," i.e., sub-
jecting patients to unnecessary diagnostic and therapeutic proce-
dures in order to establish a litigation-proof "chart." Defensive
medicine is practiced despite the fact that there is little agreement as
to either what procedures and clinical tests are necessary for patient
care or, conversely, the omission of which procedures and clinical
tests constitute medical malpractice. To the extent that defensive
2. See Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898). For a collection
of selected definitions of medical malpractice to the same effect, see REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, STATE OF NEW YORK 170-72 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as N.Y. PANEL REPORT]; I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE § 8.03 (1985). See generally A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW (2d ed.
1978); D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-THE ATL
SEMINAR 449-68 (L. Harolds & M. Block eds. 1966). There is some question whether the
applicable standard is that of the practitioner in the particular locality, or whether a broader
or national standard is applicable. Most states reject the locality rule. See DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-APPENDIX 155 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]; W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 185-89 (5th ed. 1984).
3. See generally D. HARNEY, supra note 2, at 88-193; A. HOLDER supra note 2, at 43-
71; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 185-93.
4. For a discussion of the relationship of medical malpractice to physician discipline,
see infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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medicine is real, it is a public health concern because it results in a
misuse or waste of scarce medical resources.5
This Article focuses on the major problems of public policy and
cost in medical malpractice which result from the present system's
reliance on medical malpractice liability insurance. Liability insur-
ance serves two functions. It protects physicians against personal
liability for damages for medical malpractice, and it provides an in-
surance pool to pay damages to victims of medical malpractice.
During the early 1970's, the payouts on this liability insurance rose
so astronomically-in some cases tenfold-that in 1974, several im-
portant insurers withdrew from the field. After a temporary respite,
this scenario repeated itself in 1985.
Unable to obtain adequate insurance coverage in 1975 and 1985,
physicians in several states threatened to stop rendering profes-
sional services unless properly protected. These threats triggered
the much-discussed "medical malpractice crisis" of recent years.
The ensuing critical review of medical malpractice insurance shows
that the system is very expensive and absurdly ineffective-only
one-fourth of the costs is used to compensate victims. Moreover,
vast amounts of public funds are being misspent because the cost of
health care includes the cost of medical malpractice coverage.6
This absurdly inefficient system has few justifications. It fails to
discipline physicians or to advance their competence, fails to com-
pensate victims fairly, and moreover, it is premised on an outmoded
theory of liability. A more equitable and efficient system must be
found.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PHYSICIAN COMPETENCE
In 1970, there were 18,000 new malpractice claims.7 That same
year, 16,000 existing claims were closed, fifty percent without re-
course to a lawsuit.' The other 8,000 resulted in lawsuits, but
eighty percent never went to trial.9 The remaining 1,600 claims
were resolved by jury trials, with physicians winning four out of five
cases-i.e., only about 320 plaintiffs actually won their case after a
5. For a discussion of medical malpractice and defensive medicine, see infra notes 46-
54 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of medical malpractice and the cost and effect of liability insurance,
see infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
7. See HEw. REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
8. See id. at 10.
9. See id. at 9.
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jury trial.10 Even assuming that only a small percentage are justi-
fied, the sheer number of medical malpractice claims raises the
question of physician competence." That issue vitally touches the
public health, since most efforts to improve the public health ulti-
mately rely on the professional efforts of physicians. Furthermore,
the number of claims belies the argument that private medical mal-
practice claims are an important device to maintain professional
discipline and competence. 2
Medical malpractice, based on the theory of negligence, is part
of the law of tort. The main purpose of tort law is to find fault for
wrongdoing and to deter the wrongdoer by compelling him to pay
damages to the victim." Hence, in order to prevail in the medical
malpractice situation, the claimant must show that the physician or
other health care provider was negligent, i.e., that he failed to pro-
vide adequate medical care, and that this failure was responsible for
a bad medical outcome. When the victim-plaintiff succeeds in
showing such actionable negligence, the cost of the bad outcome is
then shifted from the patient-victim to the physician-wrongdoer by
way of damages. It is assumed that, if the physician is forced to
bear the cost, he, as well as other providers, will be more careful.
Thus, further bad outcomes will be avoided.14
The other aim of the system is to provide proper and just com-
pensation to injured persons. The system was originally intended to
provide damages to only those victims who were entitled to com-
pensation as a result of a physician's negligence. 15 Over the years,
the system has moved in the direction of compensating not only for
the results of negligence, but also for a variety of bad medical out-
10. See id. at 10.
11. Especially when one considers that approximately 45% of all claims resulted in a
payment to the claimant. See id.
12. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 16: "The number of malpractice claims
continues to rise without any necessary relationship to negligent medical care. Our best hospi-
tals and specialists are sued for millions of dollars." The report notes that there are no relia-
ble indications "how much medical injury, negligently induced or not, exists in the medical
care system .... " Id.
13. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11.5 (1956); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 1, at 5-7.
14. For a discussion of this generally accepted thesis, see Mechanic, Some SocialAspects
of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE DUKE LAW JOUR-
NAL SYMPOSIUM 1 (1977). For more recent critical commentary on the deterrence theory,
see Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts about
the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 949-93 (1984).
15. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 169; Meisel, The Expansion of Liability
for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56
NEB. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1977).
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comes in situations where negligence, although asserted, is far from
clear. 16 This point will be discussed at greater length in another
context. 17
The presence of liability insurance in the system serves a dual
purpose: it protects the assets of the physician or other provider,
and it assures the victim a more certain recovery than would reli-
ance on the provider's own personal resources.18 In meeting these
two purposes, however, liability insurance largely defeats the pur-
poses of deterrence implicit in the law of medical malpractice, for it
effectively insulates the physician against the consequences of his
culpable mistakes. A physician who has been found negligent does
not even pay more for his insurance because medical malpractice
liability insurers do not "experience-rate" the individual physician
in most states. 19 Moreover, the physician or other health care pro-
vider does not bear the financial burden of his insurance coverage,
even though he writes the check for the premium.2'
While the theory of tort law is to deter the negligent or incom-
petent practice of medicine, the practical effect of liability insurance
is to protect physicians from the adverse financial consequences of
such practice. Trial lawyers and patient advocates who argue that
the current medical malpractice system is an instrument of medical
16. The N.Y. PANEL REPORT states:
Since the existence of injury rather than fault is often the basis of the initiation and
termination of a malpractice action, the system, under the guise of negligence, no
longer adequately differentiates between cases of negligent conduct and those of
simply poor results.
The effect of the development of the tort system for malpractice claims into one
of injury compensation is that the finding of fault is no longer the principal goal in
inquiry, but has become merely a hook upon which to hang the injured plaintiff's
right to recover.
N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 169. See also Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520
P.2d 981, 984 (1974) (Utter, J., concurring) noting that in actuality the court had decided
who "between an innocent plaintiff and doctor" should bear the risk of loss. See also Meisel,
supra note 15, at 56-59 (the system is moving toward strict liability). The N.Y. PANEL RE-
PORT notes in its findings the development of the notion that the "victim of adverse medical
outcomes or injuries resulting from medical treatment ought to be compensated." N.Y.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
18. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 13; Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of
Medical Losses, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE DUKE LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM 107,
108-11 (1977).
19. Instead, practitioners have traditionally been rated by location and specialty. See
N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 223. The lowest rate was set for psychiatrists, the
highest for neurosurgeons. Within particular specialties, rates are higher in urban centers,
and are lower for nonurban practitioners. New York has since begun a system of experience
rating. See Bell, supra note 14, at 955-57.
20. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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discipline21 are quite misguided. They are correct, however, in cit-
ing the tort law remedy as the only instrument presently available
to vindicate the rights of the patient who has been hurt by physician
negligence.22 If society were truly committed to the deterrence the-
ory of tort law, medical malpractice liability insurance would be
eliminated because it shields the physician against the consequences
of his alleged wrongful and negligence acts. This would be analo-
gous to the law of the nineteenth century when courts invalidated
liability insurance contracts as contrary to public policy because
they allowed a person to insure against his own wrongdoing.23 It is
unlikely that such a return to a supposedly more "responsible" view
of tort law would be welcomed either by physicians (who would
have to carry the cost themselves)24 or by patients (who would have
to forego a ready source of payment for their judgments).2 5
The present system suffers from inherent contradictions-it
aims to compensate the victim and deter the wrongdoer while it
protects the wrongdoer's assets.26 It is also evident that knowledge
of the availability of the malpractice insurance pool has had the
effect of increasing the number and size of claims for damages.2 7
21. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 28-
50 (1978); Weitz, New York State Trial Lawyers Position Paper on Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance, 10 TRIAL LAW. Q. 1, 7 (1974): "One may rightly argue that the legal profession
through the aegis of malpractice suits has in fact elevated the standards of medical care in this
state."
22. While, in theory, a patient who has suffered an injury resulting from malpractice
could complain to the state medical practice board or to the appropriate medical society, in
practice, neither of these institutions is likely to prove effective in disciplining the physician.
See R. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES 87-89
(1967); F. GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE 23-25, 125-30
(1979). Even if the board or society were to find the physician at fault, such a finding would
not produce any compensation to the patient.
23. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 585-86. See also McNeely, Illegal-
ity as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 31-33 (1941) (denial of recovery
as a deterrent to antisocial conduct). For an early discussion of the distinction between insur-
ing against the consequences of intentional misconduct and insuring against the consequences
of negligence, see Waters v. The Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213 (1837).
24. The very threat of the unavailability of liability insurance created the medical mal-
practice crises in 1975 and 1985 in which some physicians indicated that they would not
engage in practice unless protected by insurance.
25. Patient groups have generally favored laws that support insurance availability. See,
e.g., Malpracticel the Consumer View, in CONSUMER COMMISSION ON THE ACCREDITATION
OF HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 2, 3 Health Perspectives, May-June 1975, at 7.
26. For comments on this inherent contradiction, see Bell, supra note 14, at 949-56;
N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
27. It is difficult to demonstrate that the availability of an insurance pool has had the
effect of increasing the number of claims and their severity, but the position accords with the
insight of plaintiffs' attorneys who look for a responsible and solvent defendant. For claim
experience, see infra notes 43, 58, 61, 79. See also Harley & Rheingold, New Survey of Mal-
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Demands for damages continue to expand the boundaries of negli-
gence. Consequently, the funds pooled by insurance carriers to pay
damages for negligence are used as compensation for bad medical
outcomes in situations where negligence is attenuated or only re-
motely demonstrable.28
One reason why malpractice litigation continues to be recog-
nized as an instrument of medical discipline is the lack of other
effective controls on physicians' performance. Although every
state licenses physicians and entrusts a medical practice board with
responsibility for maintaining high standards of practice, the system
has not been effective. Some 325,000 physicians practice in the
United States; of these, medical authorities have estimated that
about 16,000 are substandard in their medical knowledge and medi-
cal techniques. Yet, fewer than 100 physicians have had their
licenses revoked each year.2 9 Likewise, medical societies are ex-
pected to exercise some control over the standards and professional
conduct of their members, but this source of sel-regulatory control
has also been inadequate. The only sanction the medical societies
have at their disposal is suspension or loss of membership in the
society, which in the past had an impact on hospital privileges.
These sanctions, like revocation, are rarely exercised and generally
ineffective.30 Since hospitals are now generally held responsible for
practice Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1976 (experienced malpractice specialists will not ac-
cept a case unless it is "worth" at least $40,000 of potential recovery).
28. See supra note 16; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 590-91.
29. During the five-year period 1968-1972, only 1033 formal disciplinary proceedings
occurred in the 47 states for which data were available. See Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and
Discipline, 228 J. A.M.A. 59, 61 (1974). These proceedings resulted in 297 license revoca-
tions, 110 suspensions, 400 probations, 198 reprimands, and 28 voluntary surrenders of
licenses. See id. In a ten-year survey, fewer than 0.66% of all physicians were found to have
had charges brought against them. See id A more recent survey of nine states (with eight
states responding) found that, in 1977-1978, the picture had not changed. See F. GRAD & N.
MARTI, supra note 22, at 414-15, app. B. New York had 1191 complaints (about two percent
of the physician population), with only 17 dispositions by the medical boards and six by the
Board of Regents. See id. Michigan recorded only 15 complaints with 14 dispositions (about
0.01% of the physician population). See id. California received 2494 complaints and Missis-
sippi reported seven, but information was not available on dispositions. See id. Note that
what is classified and recorded as a complaint varies from state to state. Gross incompetence
is a basis for discipline in virtually all of the states, but very few cases based on this charge
have been reported, largely because of the difficulty of finding other physicians willing to
testify that a colleague is incompetent. See id. at 425-28. See also Grad, The Antitrust Laws
and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443, 456-57; N.Y. PANEL REPORT,
supra note 2, at 148-50 (inadequacy of regulation of medical discipline recognized as a con-
tributing cause for medical malpractice actions). The New York Times reported that there
had been a 60% increase in license revocations between 1984 and 1985. New York Times,
Nov. 9, 1986 at pt. 1, 26.
30. Current national figures on professional self-discipline by medical societies are virtu-
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the performance of their physician staff,31  discipline and physician
performance within the hospital are now more likely to be super-
vised than they were a few years ago. All the same, there is little
evidence that hospitals have been successful in weeding out incom-
petents. 32 Other efforts to control quality, such as through the spe-
cialty boards33 or through Medicare and Medicaid, 34 have been
similarly ineffective. Hence, absent effective controls on profes-
sional practice, undue reliance has been placed on the control alleg-
edly exerted by the fear of private medical malpractice litigation.35
Despite the protection afforded by liability insurance, the threat
of a malpractice suit is very real and does affect the physician's be-
havior. A medical malpractice suit may affect the physician's pro-
fessional reputation and sel-esteem. It is also very anxiety
producing as well as time consuming, and is likely to divert the phy-
sician's attention from other professional concerns. The experience
of testifying in court and of having his or her professional judgment
questioned and subject to criticism in the course of cross-examina-
tion is not only upsetting but also demeaning for most physicians.36
ally nonexistent. The most recent figures available are from 1968 when 33 state medical
societies reported no disciplinary procedures at all. See Derbyshire, supra note 29, at 60. For
several years, the American Medical Association (AMA) requested that medical societies
report disciplinary actions to the AMA, but the practice was terminated in 1969 by the AMA
Department of Medical Ethics, which considered it "a waste of time." Id.
31. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Breck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz.
App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
32. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 22, at 200-11.
33. The 22 specialty boards, which establish standards and control certification of their
respective medical specialties, coordinate their activities through the American Board of
Medical Specialties (ABMS). See id. at 88-96. The boards are private, nonprofit organiza-
tions without any governmental authority, and do not generally regard professional discipline
as part of their task. See id. For a discussion of the certification process, see Wallace, Occu-
pational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46
(1972).
34. Medicare and Medicaid attempted to control quality by means of the Professional
Standards Review Organization (PSRO). For comments on earlier PSRO effectiveness in
assuring quality of medical care, see Brook, Brutco & Williams, The Relationship Between
Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE DUKE LAW
JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, 19, 27, 50-51 (1977); F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 22, at 307-13;
Grad, supra note 29, at 477-82; Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality Cost Trade-Offs
in Medical Care; the Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 35-68 (1975); N.Y. PANEL RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 143-48.
35. See, e.g., S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 21, at 28-50; Brook, Brutco & Williams,
supra note 34, at 28-29, 44; L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE 126-27 (1978).
36. See L. LANDER, supra note 35, at 131-42. The physician's fear and resentment are
also related to the practice of defensive medicine. See id.; Bell, supra note 14, at 975-90
(discussing the psychological impact of the threat of a medical malpractice action).
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As a consequence, many physicians consent to out-of-court settle-
ments rather than face a courtroom battle.
Moreover, just as the threat of litigation has not had a signifi-
cant impact on physician discipline, the fear of litigation has not
resulted in conduct that has produced fewer lawsuits.37
However, the increase in the number of medical malpractice
claims does not necessarily bear any relationship to negligent medi-
cal care. This is not to deny the reality of medical malpractice. In-
deed, a great deal of medical injury occurs, and a substantial part of
it is caused by negligence. Yet only a small fraction of medical inju-
ries give rise to malpractice claims.3" Many of the claims and many
of the lawsuits are against the best hospitals and most eminent prac-
titioners.3 9 While only a small fraction (some three or four percent)
of reported incidents of medical error gives rise to malpractice
claims, no accurate statistics are available to show what portion of
the reported incidents are attributable to negligence.' Studies pre-
37. On November 4, 1974, the American Medical News reported that the number of
malpractice claims filed had increased eight to nine percent per year. The Insurance Services
Office, an independent rating organization, reported in 1966 that 1.7 physicians per 100 were
sued, but by 1972, three physicians per 100 were sued. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 5 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE OVERVIEW].
38. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
A study done for the HEW Committee on Medical Malpractice reported that in two
community hospitals about 7.5% of hospital admissions resulted in medical injury and that
20% of these injuries were attributable to negligence. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note
2, at 16. Yet only 31 out of 500 potential malpractice claims were actually fied against the
two hospitals. See id. at 141.
Extrapolating the foregoing percentages to New York hospital admissions "would yield a
figure of over 200,000 medical injuries resulting from medical treatment of which over 40,000
would be said to be negligently caused. This is a staggering number when compared to the
number of claims currently brought." Id See supra note 37 (presenting data on actual claim
levels).
In a study for the New York Medical Malpractice Panel, one major teaching hospital
cited 3,100 incidents a year reported by its professional and administrative staff. However,
only about 100 malpractice claims were filed against the institution. See N.Y. PANEL RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 16. The Report adds:
whether the tort system is an effective deterrent to negligent medical care by physi-
cians and hospitals seems hardly susceptible of proof. What is certain is that
whatever its effect, it has not been sufficient to prevent the persistent rise in annual
malpractice cases. A relatively small number of cases, some 2,000 in 1974, was
large enough to have occasioned the crisis in the tort law/liability insurance system.
Id. (emphasis in original.)
39. See, e.g., Hirsch, Malpractice Crisis: Facts or Fiction, 80 CASE & CoM. 3, 6 (1975)
("The 'best' and most competent physician, rather than the 'quack' is the subject of the mal-
practice suit.").
40. See supra note 38. Not only does the number of injuries and incidents exceed the
number of claims, there is also some evidence that what the medically trained person or
hospital observer perceives as an injury will not necessarily match the patient's perception.
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pared for the HEW Secretary's Report in 1973 indicate that about
twenty-nine percent of the reported injuries are caused by negli-
gence.' Thus, it appears that about four out of five reported inci-
dents are not likely to be related to negligence. There is also no
hard evidence to show that medical care has become more negligent
in recent years.42 Nevertheless, the number of malpractice claims
has continued to rise.4 3 The scant evidence available leads to some
negative conclusions: namely, that the rise in the number of mal-
practice claims may not be related to more negligent medical care
and that the assertion that the tort law and lawsuits against physi-
cians for medical malpractice exert a deterrent effect is not demon-
strated by existing evidence, despite claims by the trial bar and
patient advocates.4 At the same time, the availability of insurance
has resulted in subjecting more physicians to charges of malpractice
in instances of adverse medical outcomes as opposed to clear negli-
A risk management program at an unnamed hospital association generated about
700,000 reports of unusual incidents (such as equipment failures, anesthesia deaths,
slips and falls) over a twenty-year period. During the same period only 15,000 mal-
practice claims were filed, and 85 percent of these involved incidents that were not
reported.
L. LANDER, supra note 35, at 6. See also Bell, supra note 14, at 951 (suggesting a claim rate
of one in four malpractice incidents).
41. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 62. The Report's estimate is based on limited
studies. "Data on the size of either the universe of medical injuries or the universe of medical
negligence are so scattered and fragmentary as to be essentially useless." L. LANDER, supra
note 35, at 5. See also CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM, REPORT:
RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANCE 102-04 (1977) (reporting more than three times as
many medical occurrences that could have given rise to medical malpractice judgments than
the number of claims filed each year). In an earlier California hospital survey, it is reported
that of some 24,000 instances of malpractice in 1974, fewer than 4,000 victims filed claims.
See Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282,
1286 (1978).
42. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-17. The increase in claims and law-
suits also has been attributed to a variety of factors that cause patient anger, as opposed to
greater negligence in medical practice. See L. LANDER, supra note 35, at 3-15.
43. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 248. New York State Medical Society
figures showed that between 1969 and 1974, the number of lawsuits annually increased from
355 to 970. In the first half alone of 1975, 620 lawsuits were brought. See id. The Report
found a 20% annual trend factor, i.e., an annual increase of the combined frequency and
severity rates for the future. See id. at 19. This factor appears to have continued to 1984. See
infra text accompanying note 113.
44. See supra note 21; NEW YORK STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N, Malpractice Suits,
Patients' Only Protection Should Not Be Outlawed, in ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF
AMERICA, QUALITY HEALTH CARE-A CITIZEN'S RIGHT 294-307 (1975); Weitz, supra
note 21, at 3, 9; Lanzone, No-Fault Medical Malpractice: Is This Really the Solution?, 11
TRIAL LAW. Q. 46-48 (1975); ABA, 1977 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PRO-
FESSIONAL LIABILITY 91-92 (expressing some support for the retention of tort law
deterrence).
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gence.45 Thus, the present system has produced great social costs as
well as severe injuries to the self-esteem of competent professionals.
III. FEAR OF MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND THE DEFENSIVE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
It has been asserted repeatedly that fear of medical malpractice
litigation leads physicians to practice defensive medicine, that is, to
subject patients to unnecessary diagnostic procedures, and some-
times to unnecessary therapeutic ones, in order to establish a set of
records that cannot be faulted in the event of litigation.46
There is no agreement as to what constitutes defensive medicine.
A clinical test or procedure that one practitioner undertakes defen-
sively may be regarded by another as essential for the protection of
the patient.47 Moreover, the practice of defensive medicine may not
provide the desired protection to the practitioner, because there is
rarely, if ever, a perfect paper record or a wholly unassailable pa-
tient chart.48
45. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 18, at 125-26.
46. Defensive medicine has been defined as "the alteration of medical practice, induced
by the threat of liability, for the principal purposes of forestalling the possibility of lawsuits
by patients as well as providing a good legal defense in the event such lawsuits are instituted."
HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. See generally Project: The Medical Malpractice Threat
4 Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939. The study has been criticized for ex-
cluding general surgeons and anesthesiologists from the survey. See eg., L. LANDER, supra
note 35, at 225 n.18.
47. See Hershey, The Defensive Practice of Medicine-Myth or Reality?, 50 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 69, 71-73 (1972). Defensive medicine may also involve the physician's
refusal to undertake certain procedures. Alternately, he or she may refer patients who re-
quire such procedures to specialists or may insist on performing certain procedures only in a
hospital rather than in the office.
Recent reports indicate that resort to defensive medicine, however defined, is the most
usual reaction to the perceived threat of malpractice litigation. See Bell, supra note 14, at 966
n.120 (citing Hartnett, An Analysis of the Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life on
Obstetricians and Gynecologists in New York (Jan. 1984) (unpublished study)); Wiley, The
Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct; An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 345 (1981). The defensive practice of medicine is confirmed by numerous physicians'
surveys. See L. LANDER, supra note 35, at 135-39. These include a 1977 poll conducted by
the AMA Center for Health Services Research and Development, which showed that 76% of
III physicians who responded to a questionnaire sent to 500 doctors were practicing defen-
sive medicine by ordering more diagnostic tests and other additional procedures. See id. at
135. A similar result was reported by a 1976 Medical Society of Virginia questionnaire as
well as by a 1974 Medical Economics questionnaire. See id. at 136. The latter questionnaire
was sent to a random national sample of physicians and showed that 80% had changed their
practice in response to concerns over legal liability; 48% indicated that the change consisted
of ordering more diagnostic tests. See id.
48. For a somewhat different view, namely that the concept of defensive medicine is
subjective and that "[o]ne doctor's defensive medicine may be another's prudent medical
practice," see S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 21, at 114-15. The authors opine that, in part,
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There is agreement, however, that defensive medicine is costly
and wastes scarce medical resources. The precise cost of defensive
medicine is a matter of considerable disagreement, even though the
AMA Center for Health Policy Research has recently put a $15
billion price tag on it.49 A major cause of the disagreement is that it
is difficult to distinguish between practices that protect patients and
those that are thought to protect practitioners.
There is some agreement that there is more surgery-"elective
surgery"-in the United States than is warranted; it is undisputed
that the majority of medical malpractice claims result from surgical
interventions.5 0 It has also been asserted that thousands of deaths
occur each year as a result of unnecessary surgery.5 1 To obtain a
"second opinion" before surgery may seem a matter of good sense
to patients, but it may also be regarded as an aspect of defensive
medicine. If it is used to create advance alibis, it is costly and
wasteful. If it is used, as Blue Cross-Blue Shield has suggested, to
reduce the number of unnecessary surgical interventions, then it is a
useful device to control surgical costs and should be recognized as a
reimbursable item of medical care.52 Despite our inability to deter-
defensive medicine is simply an indication that tort law is effective in changing human behav-
ior in order to avoid risks. See id. at 115.
49. See AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE,
RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TO THE ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS
OF AMERICA STATEMENTS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CRISIS 13 n.48
(1985).
The practice of defensive medicine adds substantially to health care costs. See HEW
REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. The utilization of radiology and pathology services has risen
much more rapidly than the utilization of health services generally; this suggests a correlation
with the increase in malpractice cases. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 110. Cas-
par Weinberger, former secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, asserted that $3 to 7
billion annually was spent on defensive medicine. Weinberger, Malpractice-A National
View, 32 ARIZ. MED. 117, 117 (Feb. 1975). The cost of unnecessary X-rays alone has been
estimated at $1 billion annually. See HOUSE OVERVIEW, supra note 37, at 9.
50. In 1949, when the United States population was 148 million, 9 million surgical
operations were performed, while in 1975, 20 million operations were performed on a popula-
tion of 211 million. This translates into a 122% increase in surgery for a 43% rise in popula-
tion. See L. LANDER, supra note 35, at 50-51. Studies of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the Insurance Services Office show that about 60% of all
claims that close with payment to the claimant involve surgery. See id. at 205 n.65.
51. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Cost and Quality of Health Care:
Unnecessary Surgery (1976) (concluding that 11,900 persons died from unnecessary surgery
in 1975). The AMA strongly disputed the figure. The Subcommittee also asserted that the
rate of surgery for patients eligible for Medicaid was more than double the rate for the popu-
lation as a whole. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 21, at 18-19.
52. See Recommendation No. 4 of the N.Y. PANEL REPORT: "Require by statute sec-
ond opinions or other measures to verify the need for elective surgery, if the surgery is to be
compensated by third party reimbursement. Whenever such verification is required, both the
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mine the extent of and the costs of defensive medicine, it is clear
that a system that tends to encourage such costly and wasteful prac-
tices is undesirable.
A new development and counterpoise to defensive medicine can
be found in current cost-cutting efforts under Medicare and Medi-
caid. Recent Medicare amendments, particularly efforts to impose
cost restraints prospectively through rates determined using "diag-
nosis-related groups" (DRGs), may severely limit the physician in
making treatment choices and in determining the time of the pa-
tient's discharge from the hospital. The issue is no longer excessive
defensive treatment, but rather the tension between the physician's
desire to provide full treatment and the law's requirement to cut
costs. 53 A similar tension has arisen in the states under cost con-
tainment legislation designed to limit the cost of Medicaid.54
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE COST AND EFFECT OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Medical malpractice liability insurance has had a major eco-
nomic impact on the cost of rendering medical and hospital serv-
ices. Because of increases in the number and severity of malpractice
claims (plus adverse economic conditions and a falling stock market
which prevented insurance companies from realizing their expected
income on premium reserves invested against future claims), insur-
ance premiums for medical malpractice policies increased tenfold-
1,000%-from 1964 to 1974. Then, in 1974, several major insurers
withdrew from the medical malpractice business, thereby creating
the so-called medical malpractice crisis of that year. It is now gen-
erally agreed that it was a crisis not of medical malpractice but of
insurance availability. The crisis drew attention to what had there-
tofore been less than obvious-that the existing system was very
costly and expended substantial sums of money that could be used
to better advantage in other efforts to protect public health. The
initial opinion and the verification should be subject to third party reimbursement." N.Y.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 64 (emphasis omitted). A study by Blue Cross-Blue Shield
of Greater New York found the second opinion failed to confirm the need for elective surgery
in one out of four cases. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, at A12, col. 2 & 3. See also N.Y. INS. L.
§ 250 (McKinney 1985).
53. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. B, tit. III, 98 Stat. 494,
1061. For comment, see Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare
Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985).
54. See Note, California Negotiated Health Care: Implications for Malpractice Liability,
21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 455 (1984) (analyzing the implications of a California program of
direct, fixed-fee contracts for the rendition of care).
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cost of malpractice insurance premiums is very high: in 1976 it was
estimated at $2 billion per year. 5 The 1985 estimate by an AMA
research group is $4 billion per year.56  This very substantial
amount, however, is significantly higher than the compensation re-
ceived by the victims of medical malpractice. Such compensation
amounts to less than one-fourth of the cost of insurance.5 7 Thus, it
costs society about four dollars to pay the victim one dollar.
The major part of the cost of the system is borne neither by
physicians nor by hospitals. Since medical malpractice insurance is
regarded as a regular expense in the practice of medicine, the cost of
insurance is part of the costs figured in third-party reimbursement
rates by Medicare and Medicaid, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, and other
payors who pay nearly ninety percent of all medical and hospital
costs.5 To the extent that the cost of insurance is not reimbursed,
it is part of the physician's necessary professional expenditures and
is therefore a tax-deductible item on his income tax. Thus, the pub-
lic at large, the taxpayer, bears a percentage of the nonreimbursed
cost of insurance while the physician is reimbursed for the remain-
der through a system of elaborate pass-throughs or simply by in-
creasing patient fees.5 9 While physicians and hospitals have
55. See AMERICAN SURGICAL ASSOCIATION, Statement of Professional Liability, 295
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1292 (1976). The total figure for medical liability insurance in New
York in 1975 was $244 million. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. New York
health costs are about 11% of total national health costs. Thus, the full national cost in 1975
may be extrapolated to about $2.2 billion. Since the cost of insurance has increased by about
15 to 20% annually since the "crisis," the $2 billion estimate is probably a very low and
conservative one.
56. See AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE,
supra note 49, at 5. The $4 billion figure was provided in retort to the $1.5 billion figure
issued by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA). It should be noted, here and
throughout this Article, that all figures must be viewed skeptically in light of their source.
Moreover, all of the figures are somewhat misleading because they are raw figures, which
have never been adjusted for inflation.
57. Estimates range from 16 to 40%. See, e.g., Shapiro, Medical Malpractice: History,
Diagnosis and Prognosis, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 471 (1978) (18 to 20%); HousE OVERVIEW,
supra note 37, at 5 (16 to 38 cents on the dollar); N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 20
(25 to 40%). For other forms of insurance and social insurance, such as health insurance and
worker's compensation, the effective payment ranges from 54 to well above 90%. See id. at
20.
58. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 107. In 1975-1976, only 38.8% of medi-
cal fees were direct patient payments. See id. at 109.
59. The issue of the pass through of medical malpractice insurance premiums is fre-
quently ignored in the literature. The substantial increase in premiums is emphasized with-
out noting that the physician who pays the premium does not ultimately carry the burden,
because he is largely reimbursed by third-party payors. For a detailed analysis of this pass
through, see N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 105-09. The Report notes:
Until the present time, more than 95% of the cost of hospital malpractice insurance
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vociferously resisted premium increases, they pay, at most, a very
minor portion of the premium. The ultimate burden falls on the
public.' °
The present malpractice system has met the objective of protect-
ing physician's and hospital's assets at a very great cost to society
and potentially to the health care providers themselves. The cost of
the system has risen so astronomically that even its capacity to pro-
tect the assets of the health care providers over the foreseeable fu-
ture is doubtful. This pessimism as to the system's capacity to
respond finds historical support in the crisis of 1975. There, even
though the 1973 report of the HEW Secretary indicated (in what
must surely be a prime example of the clouded crystal ball) that
insurance availability was not a problem,61 a mere two years later
several major liability insurance companies withdrew from the med-
ical malpractice field.
The 1975 "crisis" developed as follows. Insurance companies,
who had raised premiums as much as tenfold in some instances,62
was passed through directly to third party payers, with the remainder being ab-
sorbed by the hospital because of bad debts or cost ceiling rules. However, it is now
uncertain to what extent the Medicaid, Medicare, and Blue Cross programs will
reimburse hospitals for the unusually large recent increases in malpractice
premiums.
Ia at 105-06.
The size of the pass through depends on third-party payor reimbursement rules. In the
past, physicians "have been able to pass through 80-90% of the cost of malpractice insur-
ance." Id at 108. See also Bell, supra note 14, at 958-60.
60. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 107. The Report calculated that of the
$116.4 million hospital malpractice costs in New York State, 90%, or $104.8 million, was
paid by public (tax funds) and private third-party payors. The Report indicated that in the
future, if reimbursement rates change, hospitals may have to absorb more of these costs. See
id. at 106.
Based on a 38.8% self-pay rate for physicians' services, it appears that $75.6 million out
of a total $123.5 million of physician medical malpractice payments are reimbursed by third-
party payors. See id. at 109. These figures do not reflect the additional public cost resulting
from the deduction of the cost of medical malpractice insurance as a business expense on
physicians' federal income tax returns.
61. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.
62. In 1960 the cost of medical malpractice insurance was estimated at $65 million na-
tionally. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 494 app. Estimates for 1975 were a billion
dollars. See HOUSE OVERVIEW, supra note 37, at 4. Nationally, between 1960 and 1970,
malpractice insurance for dentists rose 115%, for hospitals 262.7%, for physicians other than
surgeons, 540.80%. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. From 1960 to 1972, malprac-
tice insurance for the second lowest risk category for physicians nationally, on a 1966 index
of 100, rose from 71.9 to 498.3, and for surgeons, from 52.3 to 526.2. See id. For hospitals,
the rise in the index for the period from 1960 to 1972 was from 86.5 to 461.3. See id. For
physicians in New York State, the average malpractice insurance premium for the lowest
limits of liability currently available ($100,000/$300,000) rose from $275 in metropolitan
New York in 1965 to $3,150 in 1974. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 243.
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withdrew from the field for a combination of reasons.63 First, there
was the "severity" factor-that is, the substantial increase in recent
years in the size of claims, and perhaps even more significant, the
increase in the number of large claims.64 The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners noted at the time that only three per-
cent of the claims involved recoveries of $50,000 or more, but these
three percent accounted for more than sixty-three percent of the
total damages paid out.65
The second factor precipitating insurer withdrawal was the gen-
eral decline in the economy, particularly in the stock market. In-
surers set aside reserves for claims pending as well as reserves for
inchoate claims not as yet asserted based on their prior loss exper-
iences. These reserves were invested, and in good times the yield on
these reserves was more than adequate to pay the claims as they
were settled. However, as a result of adverse stock market experi-
ence during the economic downturn, insurance companies failed to
realize expected income from and, additionally, suffered losses on
the reserves. These factors continued to convince them to withdraw
from the business of insuring physicians' and hospitals' liability.6
While the crisis was really one of insurance availability, it had
63. In New York, the state which consumed 11% of the nation's health services, Em-
ployees of Wausau, a Wisconsin company that had been the principal insurer of physicians,
withdrew on July 1, 1974. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. The company was
replaced by Argonaut, a California company, at a rate increase of 93.5%. See id. Argonaut
then announced a further increase of 196.8%, effective a mere six months later, in January
1975. See id. Argonaut then reversed itself and announced its withdrawal from the New
York market for medical malpractice insurance effective July 1, 1975. See id. The combina-
tion of events that prompted the decision to withdraw from the market included both the
increase in the number and severity of claims as well as the occurrence of substantial invest-
ment losses resulting from the decline of the stock market. See id.
64. In New York, for instance, the number of incidents for which payment was made
rose from 326 in 1966 to 620 in 1974, and the average payment per incident rose from
$10,722.17 to $35,151.70 during the same period. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at
246; see also American Surgical Association, Statement on Professional Liability, 295 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1292 (1976) (number of lawsuits filed doubled between 1970 and 1975).
65. See T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW
148 app. B (1978) (fewer than 10% of the claim payments were over $100,000 but produced
66% of total claim payment dollars).
66. For a detailed analysis of the economics of the insurance industry, particularly the
impact of market reserves on the decision of insurers to withdraw from the malpractice liabil-
ity market, see S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 21, at 167-86. See also L. LANDER, supra
note 36, at 116-17. The opportunity to gain from the investment of reserves against future
claims made it possible, if not desirable, for insurers to live with the "long tail"--i.e., the
period from the occurrence of the accident to the eventual claim and its disposition, which is
a common feature of the business of medical malpractice insurance. The "long tail" makes it
difficult for the actuary to predict the frequency and magnitude of awards up to fifteen years
in the future. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18, 219-20.
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immediate repercussions on medical practice and public health
when physicians in many parts of the country threatened to
"strike"-i.e., to stop rendering medical care-unless they were
protected against liability claims.67 Though the reality of the threat
was never very clear, the legislatures of several states, particularly
those states with substantial numbers of physicians, enacted a vari-
ety of laws that purported to deal with the situation.68 These laws
were palliative and gave spurious assurances that the "crisis" had
passed. It soon became readily apparent that the problem had been
merely papered over, to reappear all too soon.69
67. There is no evidence that any strikes occurred, although such ad hoc groups as the
Physicians Crisis Committee, a group of Detroit surgeons and anesthesiologists, made threats
of "strikes" (i.e., of withholding medical services) explicitly or implicitly in their public pro-
nouncements. See L. LANDER, supra note 36, at 122-23. Physicians were outraged at the
insurers' unwillingness to carry an unprofitable line of business, yet they were unwilling
themselves to carry the risk of financial losses in professional practice that might occur with-
out adequate insurance coverage. See also Lombardi, New York- Medical Malpractice Crisis,
in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 44-48 (D. Warren & R.
Merritt eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE] in which the chairman of
the New York State Senate Health Committee describes, from a state legislator's point of
view, the physician slowdown in certain hospitals and the "strike" that was threatened.
68. For a general review and summary of this crisis-averting legislation, see A LEGIS-
LATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 67; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FUND FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION, REPORT CONCERNING LEGAL TOPICS RELATING TO MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, submitted to HEW under Contract No. 282-76-5231GS, by T.S. Chittenden, staff direc-
tor (January 1977), at iii-viii, 1-15; Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE DUKE LAW JOURNAL SYMPO-
SIUM 241, 292 (1977), which concludes rather rapidly: "It can be said with confidence,
however, that the experimentation now being conducted in fifty state laboratories will surely
serve as guideposts along the road toward the fairest and most efficient resolution of the
malpractice crisis."
For comments closer to the 1985 crisis, see, e.g., Bell, Legislative Intrusion Into the Com-
mon Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35
SYRACUSE L. REv. 939 (1984); Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 27 J. L. & ECONOMICS 115 (1984); Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compen-
sation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo"Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties,
18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143 (1981); Neubauer & Henke, Medical Malpractice Legislation:
Laws Based on a False Premise, TRIAL 64 (Jan. 1985); Note, Medical Malpractice Damage
Awards: The Need for a Dual Approach, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 973 (1983); Note, Medical
Malpractice: A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of Liability, 30
Loy. L. REv. 119 (1984); see also Survey, Torts, Medical Malpractice, 16 IND. L. REv. 401
(1983).
69. A number of commentators share this view. See, eg., L. LANDER, supra note 36, at
143-68, especially 166-67; S. LAWv & S. POLAN, supra note 21, at 195-205; see also ABA,
supra note 44, at 9-10, commenting on the 1977 situation:
When the Commission was established in February 1975, a crisis in the delivery of
medical care seemed imminent because of the unavailability of liability insurance at
a cost which was acceptable to high-risk providers. Now, a little more than two
years later, the medical malpractice crisis seems to have abated, and much of the
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V. LEGISLATION TO RESOLVE THE INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY CRISIS
The laws passed in 1975 or thereabouts fall into two general
categories. First, laws were passed restructuring the kind of compa-
nies that would offer medical malpractice insurance, and the kind of
policies they would offer. Second, laws were passed reducing the
risk of judgments, especially large judgments, for physicians, and,
consequently, for insurance companies. These legislative efforts
share two characteristics-they hurt claimants who were forced to
shoulder more of the burden for adverse medical outcomes, and
they did not benefit physicians and insurers. The 1975 crisis re-
turned in 1985 in a strikingly similar scenario-premium increases,
threats of physician strikes, followed by another round of legislative
activity which mimicked the discredited 1975 efforts.
A. Legislation to Restructure the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Market
The majority of states passed legislation which provided for the
availability of medical malpractice insurance by establishing joint
underwriting agencies, i.e., insurance pools that were to carry the
obligation of malpractice insurance,7" or by authorizing the estab-
attention to such problems has shifted to product liability, legal malpractice and
municipal liability ....
Joint underwriting associations, patients' compensation funds, and provider-
owned insurance companies have been established in many states, thus creating ad-
ditional sources of insurance. Also, many larger hospitals have developed self-in-
surance plans to obviate the need to transfer some or all of their risks to insurance
companies. The health care industry has generally found it possible to adjust to
large premium increases by passing them on to patients or third party health insur-
ers in the form of higher charges. In this way the impact of these increases has been
diffused throughout the nation's health care system.
The publicity accompanying the medical malpractice crisis, protests by provider
groups and a continuing advertising campaign by liability and health insurers ap-
pear to have contributed to a leveling off of the number of law suits and the size of
verdicts.
The many changes in tort law and procedure adopted by state legislatures in
1975 and 1976 may have had some downward impact in some states on the fre-
quency and severity of claims and therefore may have lessened the escalation of
insurance rates, but most of the enacted tort law changes do not reach the underly-
ing problems.
70. ALASKA STAT. § 27-26-20; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2508; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-4-80; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6830; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1065.25; IND. CODE § 16.-
9.5-08.2 (Residual Malpractice Insurance Authority); IOWA CODE ANN. § 519a.3; K. REv.
STAT. § 304.40-400; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.46 (Residual Malpractice Authority);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3413; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-2401; MD. INS. CODE ANN. 48A,
§ 550; MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 175A-SA; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500-25000; MINN.
STAT. § 60F.02; MiSs. CODE ANN. § 80-30-1; Mo. REV. STAT. § 383.150; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-6003; NEV. REV. STAT. § 686.180 (enacting legislation if no other coverage avail-
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lishment of mutual insurance companies by physician organizations
or medical societies.71 In a number of states, these new insurance
arrangements were incorporated in temporary legislation. The leg-
islation was to expire in a few years, when it was expected that more
conventional insurance would be available.71 Several states went
beyond the joint underwriter or mutual company schemes by estab-
lishing a state stabilization reserve fund to pick up excess risks or
exceptional recoveries.73 Other states established patient compensa-
tion funds to provide a secondary source for patient recovery.74
These insurance devices were clearly unobjectionable: they made
insurance available, thus keeping physicians in practice, and they
also assured patients a fund for the payment of damages. However,
these makeshift insurance arrangements did not solve the basic
problem. They did not attack the issue of the excessive cost of the
system; they merely provided a way to carry these costs for the next
few years. The joint underwriters and mutual companies had to
able); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.30; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-34.1; N.Y. INS. LAW § 681; OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.73; P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 4104; S.C. CODE § 38-19-40; S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 58-23-17-1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-33-101; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
34.1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4961; VA. CODE § 38.1-775; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 619.04.
71. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-5318; N.Y. INS. LAW § 681; N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-
40-01.
72. E.g., California, to Mar. 1, 1978; Colorado, to Feb. 1, 1978; Delaware, two years;
Idaho, to Jan. 1, 1978; Illinois, to 1981; Iowa, two years; Maine, to July 1, 1979; Mississippi,
to May 1, 1979; New Jersey, to Jan. 1, 1982; New Mexico, one year after effective date; New
York, to July 1, 1981; Ohio, to Dec. 31, 1980; Puerto Rico, not to exceed eight years; South
Dakota, two years; Vermont, to Dec. 31, 1981; Virginia, to July 1, 1980. The first expiration
date has been given; for citations, see supra note 70. Note that many of the laws have since
been extended.
73. The following states have established state stabilization reserve funds: Alabama
(ALA. CODE § 27-26-27 (1977)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-907 (Supp. 1985)),
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6833 (Supp. 1984)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 6-1001
(1979)), Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.212 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3414 (1981)), Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 553 (1979)),
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2508 (West 1983) (board to submit plan for
fund)), Minnesota (MwN,. STAT. ANN. § 62F.09 (West Supp. 1986)), Mississippi (Miss.
CODE ANN. § 83-36-13 (Supp. 1985)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.30D-9 (West
1985)), Ohio (OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.74 (Page Supp. 1984)), Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-33-106 (1980)), and Virginia (VA. CODE § 38.1-781 (1981)).
74. The following states have established patient compensation funds: Florida (FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (West Supp. 1985)), Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.300
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-4-1 (West 1984)), Kentucky
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN, § 304.50-330 (Baldwin 1981)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299.44 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-25 (1984)),
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-254.21 (1982)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 26-40.1-15 (1983)), Puerto Rico (P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 26, § 4105 (Supp. 1983)), South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985)), and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 655.27 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985)).
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raise their premiums substantially each year,75 so that within three
to four years of their creation, their premiums, too, doubled. Thus,
the public cost of medical malpractice liability insurance continues
to grow.
B. Legislation to Shorten Statutes of Limitation
Many states shortened the time period within which a plaintiff
may bring a lawsuit for medical malpractice.7 6 In New York, not
only was the statute of limitations reduced from three to two and
one-half years, but in the case of minors, the law was changed to
require the commencement of any lawsuit no later than ten years
after the occurrence of the injury. 7 This changed the prior law that
allowed minors to reach majority before bringing suit.7  Commen-
tators generally agree that reducing the statute of limitations will
neither reduce the number of malpractice actions brought, nor im-
prove insurance availability, because it will have no impact on ulti-
mate recovery. 79 However, it may unfairly disadvantage some
75. Following the "crisis" in New York, the joint underwriter, Medical Malpractice
Insurance Association, filed a 90% rate increase. However, the superintendent of insurance
allowed only a 20% rate increase. J. LEWIS & S. CLUMNA, HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE IN-
SURANCE IN NEW YORK STATE 7-8 (1977). The mutual company, Medical Liability Mutual
Insurance Company, was granted a 20.6% rate increase. See id. Their report showed a com-
bined increase in cost per bed of hospital insurance fee for commercially and self-insured
hospitals of 332% in the two years 1974-1975 to 1976-1977. See id. at 33; see also A. MUR-
RAY, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA 2 (Health Policy Program
1976) (predicting that "premium levels can only continue to rise over the next few years").
76. For instance, Alabama's time limit is now two years from injury or six months from
discovery provided that filing occurs within four years of the alleged malpractice. Neither
limit applies to minors under four who may only file suit upon their eighth birthday. See
ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1977). In California, the time limit is three years from injury or one
year from discovery. These limits do not apply if there is proof of fraud, intentional conceal-
ment or a foreign body in the injured person. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.5 (West 1982).
77. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
78. Under prior law, a minor could bring a medical malpractice claim within three years
of reaching the age of eighteen. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney 1972). The
new two and one-half year statute of limitations commences on the date of the treatment or
surgery complained of or on the date of the last treatment in the case of a continuous course
of treatment. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1986). In actions based
on discovery of a foreign object in the patient's body, once the two and one-half year statute
has run, suit must be brought within one year of discovery, or within one year from the time
when such discovery should reasonably have been made. See id.
79. Although trial lawyers and patients' rights groups initially opposed the New York
reduction of the statute of limitations, their opposition was not very vigorous, thus indicating
that the change is not likely to reduce the number or the severity of claims. See N.Y. PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 176. The ABA 1977 Report of the Commission on Medical Profes-
sional Liability concluded (at 55): "Even as important a change as shortening the statute of
limitations may have a small impact on costs." The report noted that 98% of injuries are
known within two years. However, it added that the limitation on the time for suit on behalf
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claimants.
C. Legislation to Limit Actions Based on Failure to Obtain
Informed Consent
A physician's failure to fully inform his patient and to obtain the
patient's consent prior to a surgical or diagnostic procedure consti-
tutes grounds for a "battery" action, i.e., for an unlicensed touching
of the person.8 0 In recent malpractice actions, failure to obtain in-
formed consent has been included as an allegation of malpractice.
Some of the new legislation seeks to limit this development by statu-
torily defining what constitutes informed consent or by creating a
presumption that the patient has given his informed consent unless
fraud on the part of the physician is proved. 1 Since very few mal-
of minors, etc., would have a stabilizing effect on actuarial calculations. See id. at 56. An
Insurance Services Office Closed Claims Survey found that 98.1% of all incidents, involving
98.3% of all awards in total dollar amount, are reported within five years of occurrence,
prompting the comment that "although the tail is long, it may not be very wide." Abraham,
Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977).
80. See, eg., Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 A.D.2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559
(1973). The underlying rationale for the doctrine of informed consent is that every person
has a right to determine what should be done to his body and that he cannot exercise that
right unless he is told what the physician proposes to do and what the likely consequences
will be. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. Some commentators contend that the
doctrine of informed consent, while having originated in battery, has now developed into a
tort of negligence. See, ag., Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J.
1632, 1636 (1974); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 165. Others acknowledge
that the doctrine can be identified with either negligence or battery, without expressing a
preference. See, eg., Comment, A New Standard for Informed Consent in Medical Malprac-
tice Cases--The Role of the Expert Witness, 18 ST. Lois U.LJ. 256 (1973); D. HARNEY,
supra note 2, at § 2.5; A. HOLDER, supra note 2, at 260.
The Secretary's Commission found it an "abuse" that liability could attach under the
doctrine without proof that the physician was negligent. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at
29. On the other hand, the Committee on Medicine and Law of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York found that the doctrine is "salutary and probably restate[s] a require-
ment of medical ethics." Committee Reports the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 30
REC. A.B. Crrv N.Y. 336, 349 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NYC Bar Association Report].
81. The following states have enacted informed consent statutes: Alaska (ALASKA
STAT. § 9.55.556 (1985)); California (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4211.5 (West Supp. 1986));
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (Supp. 1984)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.46 (West Supp. 1985)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2901 to -2907 (1979)); Hawaii
(HAwAII REv. STAT. § 671-3 (1976 & Supp. 1984)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137
(West Supp. 1985)); Kentucky (KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 404.40-320 (Baldwin Supp. 1981));
Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1229.40 (West 1977)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 2905 (Supp. 1985)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2816 (1984)); Nevada (NEv.
REV. STAT. § 41A-1 10 (1979)); New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C2 (1983));
New York (N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (Consol. 1985)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.13 (1985)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-05 (1978)); Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Page 1981)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 677.097
(1985)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-19-32 (1985)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.
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practice actions rely solely on the failure of informed consent, this
legislation does not make any real difference to claims experience or
to total damages paid out.8
2
D. Legislation to Limit Res Ipsa Loquitur
Some states responded to physicians' demands that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur be abolished in medical malpractice cases. Phy-
sicians and medical societies have mistakenly asserted that the doc-
trine required the physician to prove that he was not negligent
rather than compelling the plaintiff to prove negligence aflIrma-
tively s3 The doctrine, which literally translated means "circum-
stances speak for themselves,"84 is an evidentiary device that allows
the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case, i.e., a case legally ade-
quate to go to the jury, on the basis of certain well-defined circum-
stantial evidence." Classic situations in which the doctrine has
been applied include a clamp left inside a patient during surgery or
§ 29-26-118 (1980)); Texas (TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 6.01-.07 (Vernon Supp.
1986)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909
(Supp. 1984)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050 (Supp. 1986)). See also A
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 67, at 10.
82. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 38, 180; see also ABA FUND FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION, REPORT CONCERNING LEGAL TOPICS RELATING TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
73-74 (1977) (submitted to HEW) (recently enacted tort law changes, including changes re-
lating to informed consent, are likely to have only a small impact on premiums); Glazer,
Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent, 16 TRIAL L.Q., Fall 1984, at 52 (discussing how the
trial bar copes with the new requirements).
83. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 172.
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). See generally W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 2, at 257-58; HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-29.
85. See Griffen v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188 (1901); Fogal v. Genessee Hosp., 41 A.D.2d
468, 474-77, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 561-63 (1973). The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur
varies in different jurisdictions. The general view is that it is only a permissible inference. As
such, it enables the plaintiff to escape a directed verdict against him and instead allows the
case to go to the jury. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, at 258. But in some
jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof, i.e., risk of nonpersuasion, to the
defendant. See Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 551, 328 P.2d 88, 92 (1958); Johnson v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 239 Miss. 759, 765, 125 So. 2d 537, 539 (1960). Probably the better view is
that the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur should depend on the strength of the inference to
be drawn. If the inference is strong enough that a properly functioning jury could come out
only in the plaintiff's favor in the absence of explanation, the risk of nonpersuasion necessar-
ily shifts to the defendant; otherwise, there is only a permissible inference, and liability re-
mains a factual question to be decided by the jury. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 2, at 257-59. In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff may be entitled to a directed verdict
against the defendant unless the defendant introduces evidence counteracting the effect of the
inference created by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See Moore v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry., 28 Il1, App. 2d 340, 352-53, 171 N.E.2d 393, 398-99 (1961); Whitley v. Hix, 207
Tenn. 683, 693, 343 S.W.2d 851, 856 (1961).
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an operation on the wrong part of the body.8 6 In such situations,
the injury caused to the plaintiff is of a kind not normally caused
without negligence, and the instrumentality that caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the physician. Thus, he is the
only person who can, and should, explain what happened.
Asserting, mistakenly, that the doctrine means that the physi-
cian is presumed negligent until he proves otherwise, physicians
have called for its abolition. There is general agreement that abol-
ishing the doctrine would not result in outcomes more favorable to
physicians, although it would require that plaintiffs provide more
expert testimony and would thus raise trial costs.87 Some of the
states that have legislated on the matter have merely codified the
common law rule,88 while others have limited the application of the
doctrine to foreign body cases.89 While these amendments may
make the plaintiff's case somewhat more difficult to prove, these
changes in the law neither improve insurance availability nor re-
duce insurance costs.
86. The conditions usually required before res ipsa loquitur may be applied are stated as
follows: (1) the event must be a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-
one's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; (3) it must not be the result of any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff; and (4) evidence as to the true explanation of the event must be
more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff: See Fogal v. Genessee Hosp.,
41 A.D.2d 468, 474, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 560 (1973); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 2, at 244; 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 14-1 to 14-60. See
AMA Model Res Ipsa Loquitur Law, which enumerates a number of situations in which a
permissible inference of negligence may be drawn, including foreign objects unintentionally
left in the patient's body after surgery; an explosion or fire originating in a substance used in
treatment; an unintended burn caused by heat, radiation, or chemicals suffered in the course
of medical care; an injury to a part of the body not directly involved in treatment; or surgery
performed on the wrong patient, or the wrong part of the body. See also Abraham, supra
note 79, at 499-500 (general discussion of use of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice
cases).
87. "The abolition of the doctrine here [in New York] would not produce more out-
comes favorable to the health care provider. It would only require additional expert testi-
mony, in situations where they are not really needed, thus increasing trial costs." N.Y.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. The conclusion appears to be accurate in those states
where few cases have been decided on the issue. In a few states, however, notably California,
the doctrine has been stretched to support outcomes generally more adverse to physicians.
See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 29; Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical
Malpractice Law--Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REv. 251
(1962).
88. See, eg., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9.1 to 16-9.5-9.9; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40; 1299.47; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-4901.
89. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45(4) (West 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 9-2794;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-07.
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E. Legislation to Require Submission of Cases to Review Panels
A number of states enacted legislation providing for submission,
mandatory in some states and voluntary in others, of malpractice
claims to a medical liability review panel first, generally composed
of both physicians and lawyers.9" While initially viewed as a device
to aid the early settlement of cases, the use of such panels has raised
further issues, such as the admissibility into evidence of the panel's
conclusions and findings in the event that the case goes to trial. In
many states, the panel's findings are admissible though not conclu-
sive.91 In some states panel members may be called as witnesses. 92
Although such panels have been applauded as a device to weed out
frivolous cases, they seem to lengthen the process by requiring the
basic issues to be tried before two separate tribunals. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the use of panels reduces the number of
claims or the size of the judgements.93
90. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 §§ 6803-6814
(1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 (1976) (amended 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5
to 9-1 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.47
(West 1973) (amended 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2811; MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 60B (West 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1 to :10
(1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-14 to -28 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (Consol. 1983)
(amended 1984, 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.21 - .24 (Page 1981); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.501-514 (Purdon 1985); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 4110-4113 (1985);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02-.21 (West 1980) (amended 1984).
91. E.g., Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York (if panel mem-
bers concur), Ohio, Pennsylvania (as to liability, not damages).
In Maine where the panel's findings are not admissible, the panel is obligated to supply an
expert witness for the claimant if the panel has found in his favor. New Mexico will also
supply an expert witness for the winning complainant, though the panel's findings are admis-
sible in evidence. See citations, supra note 90.
92. E.g., Indiana, Louisiana, Kansas, and New York (but only as to panel's recommen-
dations). See citations, supra note 90.
93. Review panels, or mediation panels, were first used in New York in 1971 in the First
Judicial Department of the state, when Harold A. Stevens, then presiding justice of the Ap-
pellate Division of the First Department, introduced them by judicial rule. See N.Y. PANEL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 210. In 1974, the system was adopted statewide by legislation. See
id. Because of the long experience with such panels in New York, the comment of the New
York Special Advisory Panel of Medical Malpractice is especially salient:
The evidence suggests that the screening panels do not affect the severity factor in
settling malpractice claims. The increase in settlement figures coming out of the
panels has been as great as the general rise in claims costs and sometimes even
greater. The average award following mediation panel settlements in Kings County
through June 1974 was almost $40,000, and for Queens County in 1975, is close to
$58,000. The evidence indicates that where the Panel recommends a finding of lia-
bility, a settlement almost always occurs. Where the recommendation is against the
finding of liability, or where the settlement figure which the panel finds reasonable is
unsatisfactory, the plaintiff invariably decided to go to trial. Thus, it is fair to con-
clude that the mediation panel procedure reflects the general thrust of the system.
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F. Legislation to Limit Recoveries Generally for Certain
Categories of Damages
Some states have attacked the "severity problem"94 of large ver-
dicts by limiting medical malpractice recoveries. A few states have
placed a flat limit or "cap" on medical malpractice damages, set
variously at $200,000, $500,000, or $750,000. Other states limit
noneconomic damages-generally, damages for pain and suffer-
ing.95 The limits are generally rather high, and it is doubtful
whether they will make a significant impact on the total damages
paid out. However, they may severely penalize a particular plaintiff
who has suffered very serious injury. Legislatures face a very diffi-
cult policy decision-unless these limits are severely reduced, there
will be little or no impact on insurance premiums or availability.
But the lower the limit set, the larger the number of claimants who
will be adversely affected.
G. Other Legislative Remedies
Other legislative remedies include limitations on lawyers' con-
tingent fees in medical malpractice cases; the abolition of the so-
called collateral source rule; the requirement that jury verdicts be
Id. at 48-49 (emphasis deleted). The report concluded that the panel device should be contin-
ued because it encouraged settlement of many worthwhile cases and thus was useful in that
limited way. See id. at 49. The ABA 1977 Report of the Commission on Medical Malpractice
Liability, at 41-48, reviewed the panel device at length, comparing states where resort to
panels is voluntary with states where it is mandatory; states where the panel procedure has to
be resorted to before formal legal action is brought and states where more formal post-suit
requirements for panel review have been imposed; as well as the different consequences pro-
vided by state law for panel reports. After reviewing arguments for and against the use of
panels, the ABA Commission concluded that it was unable to recommend a model panel
procedure, indicating that more experience with the device should be collected. The ABA
Commission staff had strongly supported review panels, largely on the grounds that they
screened out worthless cases. See id. at 49-61. Note that neither the ABA nor its staff found
that review panels had any impact on the cost of the system. See also S. LAW & S. POLAN,
supra note 21, at 124-28.
94. "Severity" is used as a technical term in liability insurance. In setting rates for
liability insurance, including medical malpractice insurance, the most significant factors are
frequency, i.e., the number of claims made each year, and severity, i.e., the size of the pay-
ment per claim, the length of the claims period and the percentage of the number of all claims
which such large claims constitute. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9, 216-21;
Roddis & Stewart, supra note 18, at 1299-1300.
95. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2.2 (West 1978) (general limit $500,000); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 1977) (general limit $500,000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-c:7 (1955) ($250,000 "non-economic losses"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-6 (1978)
($500,000, except for punitive damages and medical care and similar benefits); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1953) ($200,000 limit on "general" damages; special damages
cover economic damages); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 21-3-11 (1969) ($500,000 limit in
"general" damages); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1950) ($1,000,000 general limit).
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itemized (this is useful in limiting recoveries for pain and suffering,
because otherwise a jury could exceed the statutory limit by placing
such damages under another category); and the substitution of arbi-
tration for litigation in the courts.
Under the collateral source rule, if a plaintiff receives compensa-
tion for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the
tortfeasor-e.g., workers' compensation, private health insurance-
the fact of such payment is inadmissible in evidence and the pay-
ment cannot be deducted from the damages which he would other-
wise collect from the tortfeasor. This rule has been modified in
most states. A majority of states now provide that payments from
other sources be offset, or otherwise taken into account, so as to
avoid double recovery. Although very extensive cost savings were
claimed for these modifications the full amount of savings has not as
yet been documented.96
The contingent fee system is another feature of the present mal-
practice system that has come under fire and that has been affected
by legislative limitations.97 Although a number of jurisdictions
have limited contingent fees by court rule, the 1975 and 1985 legis-
lative efforts in several states limited contingent fees by statute98--
generally to levels below the traditional one-third of the judgment
or settlement. The contingent fee is defended by trial lawyers as the
client's key to the courthouse door, although it happens to be a
gold-plated key. In 1975, seasoned negligence lawyers would not
accept a case that was not "worth" a judgment or settlement mini-
mum of about $40,000.99 Today that minimum is about three times
as much.
The contingency fee issue is probably the most divisive issue be-
96. The collateral source rule prevents the defendant from introducing evidence of pay-
ment of any part of the plaintiff's damages from other "collateral sources," such as the plain-
tiff's own insurance or other third-party payors, thus resulting in double payment.
Amendments to the rule either permit the jury to be told of such collateral sources or require
that the defendant be credited for such collateral source payments, so as to avoid double
recovery. See, eg., IOWA CODE § 147.136 (1972). This has resulted in some cost savings.
See, e.g., N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 38-40, 183-86; Comment, supra note 68, at
271-74.
97. The issue of lawyers' contingent fees is essentially one of the high cost of all special-
ized professional services. After all, the cost of defending lawsuits on a straight-line, noncon-
tingent basis is as high as that of bringing them. For a discussion of the issue, see N.Y.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 42-43, 193-98; Comment, supra note 68, at 266-71.
98. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-6.8 (1983); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474(a) (McKinney
1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.013 (West 1980).
99. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 198 n.4 (surveys report "floors" ranging
from $25,000 to $75,000 depending on the nature of the law firm).
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tween physicians and lawyers. Since the plaintiff's attorney's fee
comes out of the plaintiff's recovery, it is difficult to show how
much it adds to the cost of the system. In addition, the literature
pays little attention to fees paid to the defendant's lawyers who are
paid on a time basis-win, draw or lose. We have no national in-
come policy based on social worth-some baseball players make
more than some lawyers or physicians. Absent an official measure
of social worth, lawyers resent physicians' assertions that lawyers
fees are too high; they interpret these assertions to mean that law-
yers make too much money. The only aspects of this rather nasty
fight between certain, limited groups of each of the two professions
which have any relevance to cost containment of medical malprac-
tice insurance are the suspicions that the contingent fee encourages
more lawsuits, and that it encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to hold
out for larger settlements or to try for larger judgments, because of
the attorney's special interest in the maximum recovery. Con-
versely, trial lawyers assert that the risk of working without a guar-
anteed fee under the contingency fee arrangment serves to screen
out cases without merit. 100 There is no clear indication how much
of a reduction in premiums can be produced by severe cutbacks of
contingency fees.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF
COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Limitations on recoveries in medical malpractice suits, as well
as procedural limitations-particularly the requirement of submis-
sion to medical malpractice screening panels-have been challenged
repeatedly. Since it is agreed that victims of medical malpractice
are not a specially protected class for equal protection purposes
under the fourteenth amendment, these statutory limitations of
common law remedies have only had to pass rational basis
review. 01
The only time the rational basis test came close to upsetting one
of these statutory limitations was in American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hospital of Los Gatos Saratoga, Inc. 102 Initially, the
California Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the stat-
100. For an overview of the entire debate, see AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, supra note 49, at 21-22.
101. See, eg., Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La.
1978); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
102. 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), vacated 36 Cal. 3d 359, 688
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ute was to lower malpractice premiums, thereby reducing or con-
taining the cost of medical care to the public.10 3  The court
concluded that the statute did not meet the rational-relationship
test because the premise that there was a connection between a re-
duction in malpractice premiums and containment of medical costs
was erroneous.'" Health care costs had risen at a rate of more than
twenty percent per year since the enactment of the provision, while
malpractice premiums had declined by twenty-five percent over the
comparable five-year period.' However, on rehearing, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court vacated the prior decision, stating "the provi-
sion is obviously not irrational."'0 6
In spite of some of the constitutional qualms that have been ex-
pressed,10 7 in this author's view, the question of statutory limita-
tions on medical malpractice remedies is less a matter of
constitutional validity than a matter of sound policy, particularly in
the light of experience. It is clear that statutorily created pre-trial
medical malpractice screening panels and legislative caps on recov-
ery severely limit a medical malpractice victim's access to the
courts, and impose a severe restriction on the most seriously injured
victims without any significant, compensating social benefits.
VII. THE MAKING OF THE 1985 INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY CRISIS
The AMA Special Task Force on Professional Liability and In-
surance reported in 1985 that during the mid-seventies, premiums
in some specialities rose almost 500%, despite significant earlier
increases. For all physicians, premiums increased 44.8% in the
two years 1983-1984, and 236% in the last decade,'0 8 in spite of the
1974-75 legislative effort. Average premiums for physicians in New
York, for instance, have risen 312% since 1975, a year that saw the
greatest premiums increase ever. 10 9 According to AMA estimates,
P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). See Note, Medical Malpractice: A Sojourn through the
Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of Liability, 30 Loy. L. REv. 136-38 (1984).
103. 33 Cal. 3d at 684, 660 P.2d at 839, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
104. See 33 Cal. 3d at 685, 660 P.2d at 840, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
105. Id. at 685, 660 P.2d at 840, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
106. 36 Cal. 3d at 365, 683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
107. See Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitu-
tional "Quid Pro Quo"Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143
(1981).
108. See AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROPESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE,
supra note 47, at 3.
109. See id.
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medical costs related to professional liability, including defensive
medicine, accounted for 20 to 25% of the $69 billion spent on phy-
sicians' services in 1983, from $13.8 to $17.3 billion."10 These
figures, to be sure, are challenged by the Association of American
Trial Lawyers, and they are unadjusted-as are all other figures in
this field-for inflation.
Even if different sets of figures are used, however, the cost of the
medical malpractice system is staggering. It has been reported that
from 1966 to 1982, personal health expenditures in the United
States grew from $39.3 to $282.8 billion a year, an average rate of
13.1%.111 From 1976 to 1981, the value of the average medical
malpractice claim in New York (reproduced in the table below) rose
at a rate of 18% per year, resulting in corresponding increases in
the cost of liability insurance. The following data for New York,
but of broader applicability, tell the devastating story:
Amount of Payout Per Year
1971 $ 7.1 million
1972 11.2
1973 17.4
1974 21.7
1975 27.6
1976 23.5
1977 31.2
1978 47.3
1979 64.2
1980 81.9
1981 91.7
Value of Average Claim
1976 $39,858
1977 44,209
1978 54,033
1979 62,963
1980 76,469
1981 89,351
If this exponential rate of growth continues, the 1989 average claim
will be $700,000112
Note that the 1975 legislation had the arguable effect of reduc-
110. See id at 4.
111. See Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984, 7
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (1985).
112. See Note, Medical Malpractice Damage Awards: The Need for a Dual Approach, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 973, 973 n.2 (1983) (The chart summarizes data from two insurers and
the New York State Insurance Department.).
1087
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ing the 1976 payout, but even that is questionable because there was
a similar reduction in payouts for those tort recoveries which were
not the subject of the 1975 malpractice legislation, probably caused
by a general change to "claims made" policies. Overall, the legisla-
tion to limit recoveries has not slowed the rate at which the value of
the average claim has increased. Furthermore, it appears that even
if the legislation resulted in the reduction of the severity factor, the
effects were minimized by the increase in the frequency of claims.
VIII. THE VANISHING OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The present system of dealing with medical malpractice by
means of the law of negligence backed by liability insurance fails to
meet a number of needs. It is outrageously expensive and absurdly
inefficient-it cost four dollars for every dollar paid out to the in-
jured plaintiff. The inefficiency is demonstrated not only by the ex-
cessive costs it imposes on health care, but also by the capricious
way in which recipients of compensation are selected. The system
overcompensates some and fails to compensate many others. 113
Legislative attempts to solve the insurance availability crisis have
met with little, if any, success and there is no reason to believe that
the chosen remedies will be more effective the second time.
A. Option One-Muddling Through
The most comfortable option, and perhaps the most likely to be
followed, is to sit tight and wait out the effects of the most recent
round of legislation. Because the limits on recovery were more fero-
cious this time than ten years ago, and because any new initiative is
likely to provide a sense of positive development, as it did the last
time, some observers will note improvements in insurance availabil-
ity and announce the end of the crisis. But although caps may limit
the severity of judgments, any resulting savings will be offset by the
increase in the frequency of judgments.
In addition, improved insurance availability does not resolve the
problem of the excessive cost of the system, nor the basic inequity of
its operation. As the "crisis" renews itself, the gladiatorial contest
between lawyers and physicians, a now recurring spectacle de-
scribed and reported in the daily press, may provide the only source
of comfort to the general public who is bearing the cost.
113. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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B. Option Two-Tort Law Changes to Assure Actuarial
Soundness and Insurance Availability
Another choice is to try to "reform" the present tort law-liabil-
ity insurance system of medical malpractice in order to ensure actu-
arial soundness and insurance availability. The goal of any reform
must be to ensure a sound basis for actuarial projections. This will
enable insurance companies to reenter the field and provide medical
malpractice insurance at stable and reasonable rates. In this more
stable insurance environment, innovations could result in further
premium reductions. Measures to achieve injury prevention might
be worked out between physicians and insurance companies. The
more successful insurance companies are in reducing the number of
injuries, the lower their premiums with a resulting increase in com-
petition.114 However, the unpredictable character of malpractice
claims raises doubts whether this is a promising area for risk man-
agement. Alternatively, injury prevention might be fostered by of-
fering lower premiums to physicians through experience rating.
To achieve the goals of insurance availability and assure con-
tinuity of physicians' and other providers' services, a substantial
price would have to be paid in terms of the other social ends of the
system. In order to reduce the cost of insurance, it would be neces-
sary to make it more difficult for patients to recover from physi-
cians. It might be necessary, for instance, to require that a patient
prove not only that the physician was negligent, but also that his
negligence amounted to gross negligence, before the patient could
recover damages. Under such a standard, fewer patients would sue,
and even fewer could recover.
In addition, it would probably be necessary to cut back statutes
of limitations far beyond the slight cutbacks already legislated. This
would mean shortening the time during which lawsuits for medical
malpractice could be brought, even though later discovery of an in-
jury was a reasonable expectation. It would also be necessary to
impose even more rigid limitations on the dollar amount of dam-
ages that could be recovered. To enforce these limits-and not to
have them nullified by sympathetic juries-it would probably be
necessary to give the judge a greater role in the determination of
liability and of damages.
Limiting a physician's liability by these means would assure in-
surance availability and would also relieve us of the threat-
whether real or not-of physician strikes. This option, however, is
114. Such risk management efforts are encouraged by the California statute.
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not likely to be acceptable to the public because the required
changes would shift a major part of the cost from the system to the
injured patient. This shift does not necessarily relieve society of the
cost, because if the injured patient cannot carry the burden- which
will often be the case-he will become a public charge or place bur-
dens on other systems of social insurance, such as unemployment
insurance, public assistance, and Medicaid. Thus, what appears to
be a reduction is in reality a redistribution. This is undesirable be-
cause the cost of medical malpractice is properly a cost of the medi-
cal care system, and to shift the cost elsewhere misrepresents the
full cost of medical care and confuses proper cost allocations. Ac-
cordingly, after considering the possibility of a redefined tort sys-
tem, the New York State Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice
concluded in 1975 that "the stringent tort law approach is neither a
desirable nor an attractive option."'1 15
C. Option Three-A Compensation Remedy
The compensation remedy abandons the proof of negligence as a
prerequisite to the collection of compensation, and generally uses an
administrative tribunal rather than the courts. This type of remedy
has found increasing acceptance, starting with workers' compensa-
tion, and its application to injuries resulting from medical malprac-
tice has been proposed for some time,116 although it has not been
adopted by any jurisdiction. However, it deserves a close look at
this time-not only because other options are running out, but be-
cause it is the only option which holds out the hope of a long-term
resolution of the problem. Moreover, the compensation remedy is
equitable, both in the social and economic sense, is affordable, and
115. N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 56. The panel believed that "it could create
actuarial certainty only by an erosion of the right to recover damages except in the most
glaring of cases, and would shift the costs to the injured patient or to sources outside of the
health care system." Id.
116. See Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step
Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 279
(1964); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"--A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 HEALTH & SOC. (MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q.) 125 (1973); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975); O'Connell, Elec-
tive No-Fault Liability by Contract- With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
59; O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INS. L.J. 261; O'Connell, No-
Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1977 INS. L.J.
531; O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L.
REv. 749 (1973); A. HOLDER, supra note 2, at 431-33 (1975); Dornette, Medical Injury In-
surance-A Possible Remedy for the Malpractice Problem, in MEDICINE, LAW & PUBLIC
POLICY 26 (1975).
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can provide decent compensation to all of the persons injured in
medical accidents, rather than outsized recoveries to a few.
1. Compensation Plan
The compensation remedy discards the most costly and trouble-
some aspect of the present tort law-liability insurance system- the
proof of negligence. A compensation system avoids the great uncer-
tainty and actuarial instability of the present system, where a small
but unpredictable number of verdicts or settlements give some
claimants such large recoveries that they distort the entire claims
experience.' 17 It also eliminates anxiety and professional insecurity
for the physician. The new approach would accept the fact that the
risk of medical injury is inherent in the contemporary practice of
medicine. It would provide compensation for medical injury as a
proper charge on the health care system.
Accepting medical injury as one of the inevitable consequences
of the rendition of health care would require recognition that a
compensation system for medical injuries is different in purpose
from a system that pays damages for the consequences of negli-
gence. It would require giving up the notion that fear of medical
malpractice litigation is a deterrent to careless practice or that it is
an effective instrument of physician discipline. Instead, the primary
objective of a compensation system would be to make payments to
as many injured persons as possible in as substantial amounts as
available, by saving the "transaction" or "friction" costs incurred to
prove negligence in the present tort law-liability insurance system.
By abandoning the requirement of proof of negligence, the new
system would probably have to respond to a greater number of
claimants."1 " The present medical malpractice system pays only a
small fraction of the premium dollar to the injured victim, using the
substantially greater part of the premium dollar for legal, claims
management, and insurance costs ("transaction costs").119 With
117. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 186-87; HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at
5-12; NYC Bar Association Report, supra note 80, at 336, 338-39.
118. Many claims that involve negligence presently go uncompensated. See HEW RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 10. It is likely that these previously uncompensated claims-which
cast costs on society through welfare and other care-taking instrumentalities which did not
appear as costs of the health care system-will be compensated under such a plan. Propo-
nents of medical injury compensation schemes acknowledge the likelihood that more of the
patients who suffered adverse medical outcomes would make claims under such a system.
See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 116, at 130; O'Connell, supra note 116, 1975 U. ILL.
L.F. at 62.
119. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 249-50.
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the reduction of legal and claims management expenses, an in-
creased number of claimants could be compensated out of transac-
tion cost savings. Thus, it has been suggested that a well-managed
compensation system may well compensate many more persons for
medical injuries than are being presently compensated without any
additional public or provider costs. 120
To be sure, the development and substitution of a new, workable
compensation system in place of the old, inadequate medical mal-
practice system will require considerable study and planning. It
will also require a number of decisions as to the precise nature of
the compensation system.
Since the purpose of the new compensation system is to make
the injured person whole, the negligence of the provider of medical
care is no longer an issue. However, in return for the certainty of
recovery, the person who has suffered a medical injury must give up
the possibility of outsized or spectacular recovery. 121 Although the
120. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 116; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 116, at 152-
53; Dornette, supra note 116, at 30; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (McDonald ed. 1971). The
New York State Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice came to the following con-
clusion on the subject:
In view of the fact that a compensation system for medical injuries is likely to incur
lower friction costs, the quarter billion dollars that are presently spent in New York
State for liability insurance could well compensate a far larger number of claimants
than is possible under the present system. Even assuming that the compensation
system would have a payout of only 75%, this would still make available over $180
million for actual payment to injured persons, a sum far in excess of any amount
paid out today.
N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 56. Under the tort system, only 25 to 40% of the total
premium cost goes to the claimant and much of the payout goes to claimants with claims
larger than $25,000 to $40,000. See id. at 98.
121. See Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975),
in which the New York Court of Appeals upheld the no-fault automobile accident compensa-
tion law:
[W]e reject plaintiff's argument that there is no reasonable basis between reform as
undertaken in article 18 and the objective of remedying the defects perceived by the
Legislature to inhere in the fault-based tort system for compensating automobile
accident personal injury claimants. On the contrary we conclude that, by eliminat-
ing recovery for pain and suffering in relatively minor cases and by simultaneously
guaranteeing prompt and full compensation for economic losses up to $50,000 with-
out the necessity of recourse to the courts, the Legislature acted reasonably to elimi-
nate much of the wasted expenditures of premium dollars on expenses extraneous to
treatment of injury (e.g., legal and investigative costs involved in determining fault
and in establishing the value of alleged pain and suffering). Such action may further
be viewed as reasonably related to guaranteeing full and fair recovery to all victims
by reducing pressure on a seriously injured person to compromise down his claims
in order to obtain funds for treatment while at the same time eliminating pressure
on insurers to compromise up claims by persons suffering minor injuries in order to
avoid the expense of investigating and defending against such minor claims ....
Id. at 55, 340 N.E.2d at 452, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 12. See also New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917), in which the New York Workmen's Compensation Law was upheld:
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injured person would be assured of recovery, the injured person
would be compensated under a system of strictly limited recoveries.
Such limited recoveries could be awarded according to a schedule of
recoveries graduated by the seriousness of the injury much like
workers' compensation,122 though the recoveries should be higher
than the workers' compensation schedules in most states, which are
currently inadequate. A system of compensation for medical inju-
ries could also follow the general pattern of the New York automo-
bile "no-fault" law.' 23 This law limits recoveries to a fixed "basic
economic loss," so as to cover purely economic damages, including
medical costs and past and future loss of earnings up to $1,000 per
month for not more than three years. 24
Under either approach, the compensation system would not
provide separate damages for pain and suffering, which in the past
have contributed significantly to high verdicts and settlements.' 25 If
a compensation schedule approach is used, the compensation sched-
ule for injuries could, and properly should, reflect some elements of
pain and suffering in the amount of compensation set for particular
injuries.
On the other hand, all systems that compensate on a schedule or
limited recovery basis present certain problems to persons with spe-
cial needs or in special situations. For example, these systems may
not adequately compensate the artist or musician who suffers an
injury to his hands. By the same token, a system of scheduled or
limited recoveries is unlikely to compensate for an executive's loss
of a very high income. However, it is precisely such specialized
awards that have given rise to very large verdicts and that have
The Statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish an-
other system in its place. If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as
before in the case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled
to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy rem-
edy without the difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the
amount of the damages ....
It at 201.
122. For example, New York law provides for payment of medical expenses and for
scheduled compensation for specified disabilities. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 13f, 13g, 15
(McKinney 1985). The adequacy of compensation under workmen's compensation nation-
wide has long been criticized. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 117-19 (1972) and WHITE PAPER ON WORKER'S COM-
PENSATION (U.S. Departments of Labor, Commerce, HEW and HUD, 1974).
123. N.Y. INS. LAW (McKinney 1985).
124. The definition of "basic economic loss" excludes elements of pain and suffering, ex-
cept insofar as they may be implicitly included in other damages. See id. at § 5102.
125. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 188; see also NYC Bar Association Report,
supra note 80, at 336, 355 (proponents of ceilings on awards urged a $100,000 limitation on
damages of pain and suffering "to avoid large verdicts in New York in the future.").
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increased the severity of claims and the expense of the present sys-
tem. Under a compensation plan, persons in these unique situations
may have to carry their own accident or health insurance to protect
themselves adequately against all accidents. The adoption of a non-
negligence-based compensation scheme would embrace the view
that broader public protection is necessary and more equitable than
the continuation of a system that grants recoveries of a very sub-
stantial nature to a very few persons without providing any recov-
ery to a significant number of persons who suffer medical injury.1 26
If negligence is abandoned as a determinant of recovery, medical
injury cases will be taken out of the courts. Under a medical injury
compensation plan, just as in workers' compensation and other sim-
ilar plans, the injured party would prove his or her claim to the
health care provider's insurers. The insurers would be obligated to
pay the claim unless the compensable nature of the injury or the
scheduled elements of the recovery was disputed. 127 These disputes
would be decided by an administrative agency, subject to judicial
review of the agency's determination.
All of the proposed medical injury compensation plans assume
that the system will not need the active intervention of an adminis-
trative agency in most instances and that the system will only re-
quire judicial intervention in unusual cases. Some cases might still
have to go to court to determine whether they involve compensable
medical injuries or come under some other legal theory. Once it is
established that the injury for which the claim is made is compensa-
ble, the only remaining issue would be the amount of recovery.
Just as in other new systems of compensation, there may be
many disputed issues when the compensation system first becomes
operational. With experience, the number of disputed issues may be
expected to stabilize.
126. See supra note 121. But see NYC Bar Association Report, supra note 80, at 345.
127. In like manner, under automobile no-fault:
"First party benefits" become due and payable "as the loss is incurred" and "are
overdue if not paid within thirty days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact
and the amount of loss sustained."... Any dispute with the insurer as to benefits
may be resolved expeditiously by submission to binding arbitration at the option of
the claimant.
Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 47, 340 N.E.2d 444, 447, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
Worker's compensation operates in a similar fashion, except that disputes relating to
claims for scheduled compensation are referred to a hearing board. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 20.
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2. Definition of Compensable Event- "Medical Injury"
Plans to compensate medical injuries without reference to negli-
gence have been opposed because of the asserted difficulty of defin-
ing the compensable event. Even proponents of these plans have
sometimes found it difficult to adequately define medical injury-
the iatrogenic, treatment-related injury. Work accidents or auto-
mobile accidents are reasonably specific events to which injuries
may be causally connected. In the case of medical injuries, there is
the recurring issue of whether the injury is caused by the underlying
disease or condition for which the treatment was sought.
128
This problem needs to be studied and worked on; physicians,
lawyers, and other specialists may well play a part in its resolution.
Considerable progress has already been made in developing illustra-
tive lists of compensable events. A general definition of medical in-
jury or a broad definition of compensable event may be unnecessary.
The solution may be found in specifying finite lists of compensable
injuries, much in the manner of the list of covered surgical and
medical procedures currently found in health insurance policies.
There is a growing view that the number of adverse medical out-
comes or medical injuries is finite and is capable of specification.
Such a listing of injuries will, of course, be subject to correction and
updating from time to time.12 9
Another approach, reflected in federal medical injury compensa-
tion legislation proposed in 1975,130 is to define the compensable
injury very generally, leaving the question of whether it is indeed
treatment-connected to the preliminary determination of a hearing
officer. A number pf other optional approaches have also been
proposed.13 1
128. See HEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 102; Keeton, Compensation for Medical Acci-
dents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 614-15 (1973); O'Connell, supra note 116, 59 VA. L. REv. at
790-93; Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J.
1141 (1975).
129. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 116, at 132-50; Dornette, supra note 116, at
33-35.
130. S. 215, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), the "Inouye-Kennedy No-Fault Proposal." In
case of contest, the compensability of the injury would be determined by the Secretary of
HEW, i.e., by an appropriately designated hearing officer.
131. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 116, at 97-138. O'Connell proposes that a compensa-
tion system be instituted on an elective, voluntary basis either by contract or by statute. This
option would enable a health care provider and a patient to agree at the time treatment is
commenced that, in the event of an adverse medical outcome, the patient would rely on the
health care provider's compensation policy, regardless of provider negligence. In return for a
right to recovery for any adverse medical outcome, the patient would waive any rights to
proceed under the negligence malpractice law. For an interim period, a provider would have
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3. Method of Payment for Medical Injury Compensation
Coverage
Who will pay for medical injury compensation raises a number
of policy issues. Most of the proposals would leave the burden of
coverage on the provider, who would purchase compensation insur-
ance just as he purchases liability insurance at the present time. 1 32
The provider would retain the option to self-insure. It has also been
suggested that the patient or consumer could pay for coverage di-
rectly as part of his medical costs. This would be analogous to "trip
insurance" in that a patient would be required to insure himself
against medical injury before embarking on medical treatment or
before undergoing a surgical procedure. Of course, such insurance
might be sold for an extended term rather than on a "trip" basis. 133
It is possible, although unlikely in light of current efforts to re-
duce the budget, that existing state and federal government subsi-
dies of medical care could be increased to cover the cost of a
compensation system. This would provide a better measure of the
public cost of medical injuries because these additional subsidies for
medical injury compensation would have to be specially and sepa-
rately budgeted. Under the present system, the public cost of pro-
viding medical malpractice liability insurance is hidden in the
general reimbursement of medical expense by the federal and state
governments and third-party payors. Because the present cost of
medical malpractice insurance is ultimately borne by public
sources, it is possible that the direct takeover of such costs by the
federal and state governments would not increase public costs very
substantially. Along these lines, it is worth noting that a number of
states have already taken on excess insurance coverage under pa-
tient compensation fund legislation. 34
Whatever method of payment is chosen, the general public,
either as taxpayers or as consumers, shoulders the ultimate cost of a
to carry negligence liability coverage as well as compensation coverage. However, the pro-
vider could be given reduced premium treatment under his or her liability policy if more than
a certain percentage of his or her patients elected to participate under his or her compensa-
tion policy. Such a plan would obviously be aided by appropriate provisions in enabling
legislation.
See also O'Connell, supra note 116, 1975 INs. L.J. at 267-93. O'Connell's proposal is
analogous to workmen's compensation statutes in that it authorizes compensation insurance
and contains provisions which protect the agreement between the health care provider and
patient from being invalidated as an adhesion contract.
132. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 116, at 139; J. O'CONNELL, supra note 116.
133. See Dornette, supra note 116, at 29.
134. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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medical injury compensation system. 13 5 The choice of method of
payment is then largely a choice of how best to reduce transaction
costs and how to reflect the cost of medical injuries as part of the
general cost of health care delivery, of which it is an integral part.
4. Constitutional Issues
The adoption of a medical injury compensation plan raises a
number of federal and state constitutional issues. These issues have
been virtually put to rest by the New York Court of Appeals' 1975
decision in Montgomery v. Daniels'36 which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the New York no-fault automobile accident compensa-
tion law. The law was challenged on the basis of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions,
and the alleged denial of the right to trial by jury. In upholding the
automobile no-fault compensation law, the court stated "that to a
very large extent the methodology of [the plaintiff's] assault would
be equally applicable (or as we hold inapplicable) to any no-fault
plan whatever its specifics."' 137 The court addressed the issues in
the context of a provision that permitted negligence actions once a
certain threshold for "serious injuries" had been exceeded. None-
theless, it is clear that the court's holding would have been the same
if the legislature had abolished the common law remedy altogether.
The decision accords with analogous decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.1
38
IX. CONCLUSION
Even assuming the medical malpractice crises of 1974-75 and
1984-85 were merely crises of insurance availability, their occur-
rence is symptomatic of deep underlying problems of public health
policy. Adverse medical outcomes are an inevitable consequence of
the delivery of health care, but not all adverse outcomes are the
results of inadequate or negligent health care delivery. The present
system of negligence law and liability insurance has borne the cost
of adverse outcomes badly: it has been wasteful and expensive,
compensating some victims of adverse outcomes quite generously
and others not at all, and it has done so at great expense in "trans-
135. See N.Y. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 101-18.
136. 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
137. Id. at 49, 340 N.E.2d at 448, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
138. E.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1977) (lim-
iting amount of liability for nuclear accidents violates due process because it forces the victim
to bear the cost of the accident while society as a whole benefits from nuclear power).
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action" or "friction" cost, so that most of the millions of premium
dollars do not find their way to the victim.
While the present medical malpractice system causes some phy-
sicians great anxiety and insecurity, there is little or no evidence
that is has raised professional standards or has improved the quality
of health care. In spite of the constant threat of medical malprac-
tice litigation, the number of claims based on negligence rises every
year.
Many theories have been advanced to explain the increase in
medical malpractice claims. These include greater utilization of
health services; greater risks associated with more advanced medi-
cal technology; changes in the traditional doctor-patient relation-
ship; greater depersonalization of health services (which deals in
"providers" and "consumers" of such services, thus giving rise to
aggressive consumer attitudes); exaggerated expectations of the ca-
pabilities of modem medicine; and the inherent problems of a
health care system that suffers from technical over-specialization
and dehumanization. Each of these theories explains only a part of
the phenomenon of increasing numbers and severity of claims. De-
spite these divergent theories, there is general agreement that ad-
verse outcomes are part of the system and must be dealt with.
They cannot be dealt with by piecemeal adjustments to the law
of medical malpractice, or by making more insurance available at
ever-increasing cost to the general public. A system of sound social
insurance is needed, a system of compensation that will compensate
the victim of the adverse outcome rather than rely on "fault" or
"negligence" to determine liability. A medical injury compensation
plan meets that need.
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